A Secure and Decentralized Registration Scheme for IPv6 Network-Based Mobility Senthil Kumar Mathi 1, M.L.Valarmathi 2 by The Pennsylvania State University CiteSeerX Archives
A Secure and Decentralized Registration 
Scheme for IPv6 Network-Based Mobility 
Senthil Kumar Mathi
 1, M.L.Valarmathi
 2 
1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Amrita School of Engineering, 
Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham University, Coimbatore, India. 
1 msenthil_cse@yahoo.co.in 
2 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, 
Government College of Technology, Coimbatore, India. 
2 ml_valarmathi@rediffmail.com 
Abstract  —  For frequent movement of a mobile device, there is a need for a secure registration 
procedure of the mobile device by announcing its current location to the home network, especially, if it is 
not in the home domain. While devising the registration procedure for mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) based 
network, it is essential to consider the security issues for cryptographic approaches and an infrastructure 
requirement on the network. If a public key based cryptography is used for improving the security, then 
the key exchange mechanisms of the communicants must be handled appropriately. The infrastructure 
based approach increases the complexity of the mobile device and the mobility agents and also requires 
an additional message exchanges. Hence, this paper deals with an infrastructure-less registration scheme 
with symmetric key approach that acts upon MIPv6 environment consisting of the mobile node, home 
agent, and correspondent node. The proposed scheme is simulated and evaluated for security using 
Murphi checker. The correctness of the signaling/message sequences of the proposed scheme are verified 
by the finite state machine. Finally, the simulation results reveals that better security and mutual 
authentication between MIPv6 nodes have been achieved, and further, mitigation for the various attack 
scenarios have also been addressed. 
Keyword- MIPv6, Transitions, Home registration, Correspondent registration, Hash function, Return 
routability 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Internet protocol (IP) mobility [1] allows mobile devices to get the services from the home network where it 
is initially registered and from the correspondents through the internet in spite of their position [2]. This is 
achieved for IPv4 based network with various registration schemes [3] proposed so far with an intermediate 
entity, called a foreign agent through which a mobile node (MN) can communicate with a home agent (HA) and 
a correspondent node (CN). But with IPv6 mobility (MIPv6), the MN can communicate with HA and CN 
directly without the need of the foreign agent, since the MN obtains its new IPv6 address called co-located care-
of address (CoA) by stateless auto-configuration [4]. The mobility agent and CNs in MIPv6 store the MN’s 
home address (HoA) with its CoA and then they send the packets destined for the MN directly at this CoA. The 
route optimization of the registration procedure is an integral part of MIPv6 and it’s just an extension in IPv4 
mobility and hence it requires the following design requirements for MIPv6: (i) movement detection - MN must 
detect that it has moved; (ii) address configuration - MN must discover or configure its CoA; (iii) binding 
update (BU) - MN must inform the HA about its new CoA; (iv) binding acknowledgement (BA) - HA must 
reply the MN for new binding updation; and (v) tunneling - HA must forward packets through a secure channel 
from the home network to MN’s CoA.The MIPv6 registration is carried out in two-phases: home registration 
(HR) and correspondent registration (CR) and these phases are depicted in Fig. 1. The steps involved in the 
registration process are as follows. 
1.  MN performs address auto-configuration to get its CoA after the movement from the home link. 
2.  MN sends the BU message to HA and registers its CoA with the home link. 
3.  HA updates its binding list (BL) and sends the BA message back. 
4.  MN sends the BU message with the destination option to CN directly. 
5.  After the binding updation, ultimately, the CN can post the BA message to the MN’s CoA directly. 
6.  If CN desires to send packets to MN, it sends them to the MN’s new CoA directly. 
A large number of related works [5]-[6] have been investigated on security issues of IPv6 mobility between 
the communicants. Almost, all of the works have described the schemes with the intention to improve the 
security and/or reduce the computational complexity of the MIPv6 registration. The crams have recommended 
that the reinstating of the scheme with new schemes to improve security. Therefore, the present paper focuses on 
infrastructure-less based registration scheme for the enhancement of security by incorporating the symmetric 
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existing registration schemes. In section III, a new infrastructure-less based scheme is proposed with the 
descriptions. Section IV discusses the security verification with Murphi model checker and finite state machine. 
Section V analyses the security consideration of the various registration schemes with the proposed one. Finally, 
section VI provides the conclusion. 
 
Fig. 1. Registration in MIPv6 = HR Steps - 1, 2 and 3 + CR Steps - 4, 5, and 6 
II.  RELATED WORKS 
In this section, we discuss some of the related works on the registration schemes of MIPv6. Basically, the 
registration schemes for MIPv6 are categorized into two major groups. The first group depends on an additional 
support for protecting registrations due to the key handling concerns and they can be categorized into two 
subgroups. The first subgroup is known as the symmetric-key based approach since they protect the registration 
process by the symmetric key shared between the communicants. The second subgroup is known as asymmetric 
based approach since they depend on a public/private key pair. The second group is known as an infrastructure-
less registration schemes. They are suited to the scenarios where nodes do not have the dependency on 
infrastructure support for key handling issues during the registration process. 
A.  Infrastructure-based Registration Schemes 
1)  Symmetric-key based approach 
Static shared key version 1 (SSKv1) scheme [7] relies on an initial setup for a secret key shared between MN 
and CN. However, the SSKv1 scheme is vulnerable to malicious MNs flooding attacks due to the intercept of 
the message by an intruder between the MN and CN. Dupont et al. enhanced the SSKv1 scheme by 
incorporating a CoA reachability test to derive at a new scheme SSKv2 [8]. But, the SSKv2 scheme has the 
same features, pros, and cons as the SSKv1 scheme. Password-based authenticated key exchange BU (PAKBU) 
scheme [9] entails a password sharing between the MN and CN. This approach provides the authentication 
between them by establishing a one-time binding management key for protecting the successive CR. 
Nevertheless, it needs the difficulty on key handling issues. Koo et al. (2006) proposed a new authentication 
scheme for BU which is based on ticket-based BU (TBU) scheme [10]. For protecting the connection securely 
between MN’s home link and CN, the scheme uses IPSec tunnel. But, the TBU scheme imposes the overhead of 
synchronizing the clocks of the MN, HA, and CN as it uses timestamps to detect the rerun attacks. Additionally, 
it increases the complexity at HAs for supporting CRs. 
2)  Asymmetric-key based approach 
Certificate-based BU (CBU) scheme [11] creates a long-term shared secret key between the MN and CN by 
using a digital signature and unilateral authenticated Diffe-Hellman key exchange scheme. However, this 
approach is suffered from the same shortcomings as the TBU scheme. Ren et al. (2006) proposed a hierarchical 
certificate-based BU (HCBU) scheme [12] with the enhancement on the CBU scheme with assurance of MN’s 
ownership for a claimed CoA. Nevertheless, the MN might continuously necessitate to replicate the pre-
handover phase, thereby, increasing the signaling overhead of the registration message sequence. The HCBU 
scheme also requires the use of trusted third parties to verify the CoAs used by the MNs and the infrastructure 
that supports the authentication service on the third parties.  
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with the assumptions on CN’s mobility. The scheme uses digital signature scheme and the CGA based 
technique to provide communal authentication among the MN and CN. On the other hand, it raises the 
vulnerabilities for denial of service (DoS) attacks; and involves the CN to perform the verification of digital 
signature in the initial CR.      
Wafaa et al. proposed an ID-based encryption for enhancing the MIPv6 registration (INF-Based) signaling 
security [14] with the centralized network infrastrucure approach. The approach requires the third party called, 
public key generator for maintaining the private keys for the CN which can be used for decryption. In a basic 
HR (BHR) [15], MN instigates a HR process after moving from its home station for registering through secure 
tunneling [16]-[17]. Then HA updates its BL and sends BA message back. However, the HA possibly will not 
authenticate the CoA sent by the MN, since the MN might recline about its current position and entice HA to 
transmit traffic to a third party causing a DoS attack. 
B.  Infrastructure-less Registration Schemes 
Child-proof authentication (CPA) scheme [18] aims to authenticate the primary entities of CRs in MIPv6. 
The CPA scheme requires one message and one-way hash function between the MN and the CN, causing 
minimal signaling overhead thereby reducing registration delay. On the other hand, the scheme is vulnerable to 
malicious MNs flooding attacks since it cannot endorse the claimed CoA. In addition, as the scheme uses 
timestamps to detect replayed BUs, it requires the synchronization in the clocks of the MN and the CN. 
Unauthenticated BU (UBU) scheme [19] is proposed to obtain a shared session key between the MN and the CN 
by using Diffe-Hellman key exchange scheme. The MN and the CN use the shared secret in authenticating 
initial and successive CRs. However, it is susceptible to false BU attack as it engrosses an unauthenticated key 
exchange based on Diffe-Hellman between the MN and the CN. Optimizing MIPv6 (OMIPv6) scheme [20] 
combines the return routability procedure (RRP) and Diffe-Hellman key exchange scheme. It consists of an 
initial registration phase and a subsequent registration phase with a correspondent node. The scheme uses a 
shared session key between an MN and a CN. Nevertheless, the MN and the CN first execute the RRP to set up 
a shared secret with the similar susceptibilities in the initial registration.  
  Early BU (EBU) scheme [21] is intended to lessen the high registration latency caused by the RRP. 
Since the scheme improves the RRP by moving HoA and CoA tests to a handover stage. However, there is a 
cost for this lessening in delay due to the usage of additional messages, and the periodic test on HoA by the MN. 
CGA-OMIPv6 scheme [22] combines the use of the RRP and the concept of cryptographically Generated 
Address (CGA) based technique [23]. But, this scheme engrosses the following requirements on MN: generation 
of public/private key pair; involvement of CGAs procedure to configure its HoA; CoA reachability proof by 
sending the test messages with a CN; and providing initial HoA ownership and reachability proofs at initial CR 
with the CN. However, it necessitates the MN and the CN to carry out additional public key operations during 
the initial CR for CGA based technique. Enhanced route optimization for mobile IPv6 (ERO-MIPv6) scheme 
[24] is a combination of EBU and the CGA-OMIPv6 schemes. It decreases the registration time between the 
MN and the CN during any CRs by sending one-way message. But, it increases the complexity at the CN for 
implementing the credit-based authorization technique [25] to restrict the amount of data that the CN can send to 
new CoA while simultaneously executing the CoA test. 
  Most of the investigations on the registration methods have accentuated that, on and average, the 
proposals are addressed with the requirement on network infrastructure based model for key management issues 
and cryptographic approaches and only few research attempts have been addressed with the decentralized 
registration procedure. Therefore, this paper proposes an infrastructure-less based mobile IPv6 registration 
scheme with the motivation to improve security on the signaling messages. The main contribution of this paper 
includes secure communication and mutual authentication between the mobile IPv6 principals by using shared 
key concepts. The correctness of the proposed scheme is verified by using finite state machine modeling. The 
proposed scheme is also evaluated using Murphi checker for the security functions and analyzed the attack 
prevention measures with the different scenarios. The next section discusses the proposed scheme. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
A.  Notations used 
The notations used in the proposed scheme with the descriptions are listed in Table I. 
B.  Scheme description 
The proposed scheme is based on the suppositions that the nonces and the secret key values are pre-shared 
between the communicants without a third-party involvement. In the proposed scheme with decentralized 
network infrastrucure as depicted in Fig. 2, the steps HR1 to HR4 and CR1 to CR4 are used to describe the 
home and correspondent registrations respectively. The intricacies of the scheme are explained as follows. 
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CoAMN, TIDMN, NHA, and NMN. 
TABLE I 
Notations used in the proposed scheme 
Notations Descriptions 
F1 || F2  Concatenation of fields F1 and F2 
H [message]  Hash value of the message  
IDHA and IDCN  Identity of HA and CN 
NHA, NMN, and NCN  Nonce of HA, MN and CN  
TIDMN  Temporary identity of MN 
CoAMN Care-of-address  of  MN 
EK[M]  Encryption of message M with key k 
K-MN-HA  Shared secret key between MN and HA 
SSK-CN-MN  Secure session key between MN and CN 
K-MN-CN  Shared secret key between MN and CN 
BUM and BAM  Bit patterns for indicating BU and BA message  
(HR2) : HA: (upon receiving HR1) 
•  Search for an entry in HA’s dynamic parameter database whose values (NHA,  NMN) matches with (TIDMN, 
NHA) in received HR1, then HA computes a new hash value H
’ with the received fields along with MN’s 
nonce  and validate it with the received hash value and finds the corresponding the shared secret key K-MN-
HA to decrypt EK-MN-HA [M1]. 
•  Produce a new nonces N
’
HA, N
’
MN and MN’s new temporary identity TID
’
MN.   
•  Compute a new secret key K
’-MN-HA via one-way function:  
K
’-MN-HA = HMAC-SHA-1 (K-MN-HA || N
’
HA || TID
’
MN || IDHA)     
•  Now, update the entry (TIDMN, NHA, NMN, K-MN-HA, Old_CoAMN) in HA’s dynamic parameter database 
with the new BU (TID
’
MN, N
’
HA, N
’
MN, K
’-MN-HA, CoAMN).  
(HR3): HA  MN: BAM, IDHA, NHA, EK-MN-HA[M2], H [BAM || IDHA || NMN || EK-MN-HA[M2]] where M2 = 
TID
’
MN, N
’
HA, K
’-MN-HA, and N
’
MN. 
(HR4) : MN: (upon receiving HR3) 
•  Compute H
’and validate it with the received hash value. 
•  Decrypt M2 using K-MN-HA and store the new values TID
’
MN, N
’
HA, K
’-MN-HA, and N
’
MN. 
Finally, the MN stops the message exchanges and ends with the successful completion of the HR registration. 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed registration scheme 
(CR1):  MN  CN:  BUM, TIDMN, NCN, EK-MN-CN [M3], H [TIDMN || NMN || EK-MN-CN [M3]] where M3 = TIDMN, 
CoAMN, NCN, and NMN. 
(CR2):  CN: (upon receiving CR1) 
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hash value. 
•  CN decrypts EK-MN-CN [M3] using K-MN-CN.  
•  Store the new CoA of MN. 
•  Generate new nonce N’CN and secure session key via one-way function. 
SSK
’-CN-MN = HMAC-SHA-1 (K-MN-CN || N
’
CN || IDCN) 
(CR3): CN  MN: BAM, TIDMN, NMN, EK-MN-CN [M4], H [TIDMN || NMN || EK-MN-CN [M4]] where M4 = SSK
’-
CN-MN, and N
’
CN. 
(CR4) : MN: (upon receiving CR3)  
After receiving the CR3 message, MN verifies the hash values to authenticate the CN and decrypts the 
encrypted part of the message using K-MN-CN to get a new nonce N
’
CN and secure session key SSK
’-CN-MN 
for subsequent communication. Finally, the MN ends with the successful completion of CR. 
IV. EVALUATION 
A.  Finite State Machine and Murphi model 
The proposed scheme is simulated and evaluated using the Murphi model checker and finite state machine 
(FSM). Murphi verification system [26] consists of a Murphi compiler and Murphi description language. The 
Murphi compiler creates a special purpose verifier from the Murphi description. The modeling of the proposed 
scheme is designed with the FSM [27]-[28], whose descriptions are coded with the transition functions. The 
scenario for evaluation comprises of the input messages HR1, Upon_HR1, HR2, HR3, Upon_HR3, HR4, CR1, 
Upon_CR1, CR2, CR3, Upon_CR3 and CR4. The states of the FSM corresponding to the three entities are 
created with the internal states and they are 1) MN: {m_sleep, m_wakeup, m_validate, m_wait, m_commit}; 2) 
CN: {c_sleep, c_wakeup, c_wait, c_validate, c_commit}; and 3) HA: {h_sleep, h_wakeup, h_wait, h_validate, 
h_commit}. A transition function Δ of an individual message is defined and denoted by, Δ (current_internal 
states, input_message) = {set of next_internal states}. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3(a). FSM model - home registration 
The finite state modeling of the HR procedure is depicted in Fig. 3(a). The FSM for HR starts with an initial 
state [m_sleep, h_sleep] and generates the transitioning to [m_wait, h_wakeup] on receiving the input of HR1 
message for BU. Upon receiving HR1, the machine goes to the validation state on HA, [h_validate] and then 
switches the state to either an acceptance [h_commit] or a trap state [h_trap] based on the verification and 
validation of the HR1 message. If the machine in [h_trap], then the registration of the MN is rejected, otherwise 
it moves up with the next transition from [h_commit] to the state [h_sleep, m_wakeup] for the input of HR3 
message and from this transitioned state, MN goes to validate state [m_validate]. After checking the HR3 
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to the trap state [m_trap] for rejection of the registration reply from HA. In HR, the BA message for MN is 
assured when it is entered into m_commit with the successful completion of the messages HR3.  
  In the similar way, the FSM for CR as depicted in Fig. 3(b) starts with an initial state [m_sleep, c_sleep] 
and generates the set of transition functions for ends up with either the final state [m_commit] or the trap state 
[m_trap] for BA on the registration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3(b). FSM model - correspondent registration 
B.  Security Verification 
In this current section, we analyzed our scheme for the prevention of the security threats by verifying the 
scheme sequence written in Murphi specifications and illustrated the proposed scheme with FSM transitions for 
the attacking scenarios which cause the failure to the intruder. For the security verification, we introduced the 
intruder for rerun attack, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and false binding attack. The model of the intruder 
allows the record of the messages. The intruder can be triggered with the following three different cases; 1) 
intruder intercepts the packet in the network 2) intruder performs rerun attack and 3) intruder modifies the 
packet. The proposed scheme is implemented in both cases (with and without the intruder). When the intruder 
model is triggered, the intruder can assail our scheme similar to the way it attacks the existing schemes. But, the 
attempt will be made to failure for the intruder in all the three cases. The sample scenarios are examined for the 
failure cases: 
•  The intruder captures HR1 message in the Murphi sequence as shown in Fig. 4 and changes the 
contents for TIDMN, and NHA. Then the intruder sends a bogus message I_HR1 to the HA to deceive it. 
Nevertheless, HA computes the hash value H for M1 in the bogus message and validate it with the 
received hash value. If they are not matching then, the HA rejects the I_HR1 message and fails to 
authenticate MN. Hence, the HA can easily detect the intruder and stop HR2 step from being 
proceeded to the MN without entering into the state h_commit. The following FSM transitions are 
accounted when the intruder captures HR1 message and sends the bogus message I_HR1 instead of the 
original message,  
     Δ ([m_sleep, h_sleep], I_HR1) = [m_wait, h_wakeup] 
     Δ ([m_wait, h_wakeup], Upon_I_HR1) = [h_validate] 
     Δ ([h_validate], I_HR2) = [h_trap] 
•  The intruder intercepts and reruns the CR3 message as I_CR3 to the MN as shown in Fig. 5. In this 
case, the intruder fails to determine the values of TID
’
MN, N
’
HA, N
’
MN and SSK-CN-MN and goes to 
trap state. The corresponding transitions are recorded as follows, 
     Δ ([c_commit], I_CR3) = [c_sleep, m_wakeup] 
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     Δ ([m_validate], I_CR4) = [m_trap] 
The intruder alters the temporary identity of the MN (TIDMN), which is easy for the CN to identify because 
the CR3 message has the original address for the correct sender (MN) with the encrypted value EK-MN-CN [M4], 
such that when the MN decrypts the M4 with K-MN-CN, it finds that their contents do not match henceforth, the 
MN does not make the transition to c_commit state. 
 
Fig. 4. Intruder model - Recording the HR messages for intercepting 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, the security considerations are discussed with the analysis on existing and proposed schemes. 
A.  Confidentiality 
In the proposed scheme, the secrecy of CoAMN is preserved in both HR and CR between the communicants. 
In the HR, the BU message of MN with the HA is encrypted with the secret key K-MN-HA and the BA message 
of the HA with the MN is encrypted with the shared secret key K-MN-HA. Since the enciphered message of 
MN will not be deciphered at the attacker side. In the CR, the BU and BA messages with MN are encrypted 
with the secret key (K-MN-CN) and session key (SSK-CN-MN). 
B.  Data integrity 
In the proposed scheme, the MN sends two messages (HR1 and CR1) to the HA and CN respectively. The 
intruder can intercept the messages, but he cannot correctly decipher or tamper the content because the two 
messages are enciphered using the shared secret keys. Hence, any alteration to the exchanged information would 
be not possible. 
C.  Authentication 
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procedure by the use of hash functions. As described in HR2, after receiving the message, HA finds an entry 
(TIDMN, NHA) in their dynamic parameter database and gets the corresponding K-MN-HA of MN, Then, HA 
decrypts the encrypted message using K-MN-HA. This is the authentication of MN to HA. As described in HR4, 
MN decrypts M2 using K-MN-HA and uses the values TID’MN, N’HA, K’-MN-HA, and N’MN to compute the 
new hash value and compare it with H [M2 || NMN] in HR3. This is the authentication of HA to MN if the 
computed and received hash values are equal. In CR, after receiving the CR1 message, the CN computes a new 
hash value with the fields TIDMN, NCN and EK-MN-CN [M3] and compare it with the received hash value from CR3. 
If they are found equivalent then this is the authentication of MN to CN. Similarly MN verifies the hash values 
to authenticate the CN after receiving the CR3 message. Table II summarizes the authentication and 
confidentiality analysis of the various registration schemes with the proposed scheme. 
D. Rerun attack protection 
The nonce is used to thwart the rerun attack between the communicating parties of the MIPv6 registration. As 
mentioned in the proposed scheme, all the communicants MN, CN and HA in HR and CR messages are used 
with nonces for identifying the unique transaction in the registration environment for preventing the rerun attack. 
E.  MITM attack prevention 
Any impostor attempts to make a false message cannot be accomplished in the proposed scheme since, it does 
not allow him to send a bogus BU message to the HA or CN due to the verification of the legitimacy of the 
principals with the hash functions of messages (HR2, HR4, CR2, and CR4) in both HR and CR steps and the 
unavailability of the shared and secure session keys in the channel as conferred in detail in the previous section. 
TABLE II 
Authentication and confidentiality analysis 
Scheme  Authentication of MN  Authentication of CN  Confidentiality of BU and BA 
CPA Yes No  No 
UBU No No  Yes 
OMIPv6 No  No  No 
EBU No No  Yes 
CGA-OMIPv6 Yes  No  Yes 
ERO-MIPv6 Yes  No  Yes 
INF-Based Yes  Yes  Yes 
BHR No No  Yes 
Proposed Yes  Yes  Yes 
F.  False BU attack prevention 
If an invader is on the channel between MIPv6 nodes and CN, he can send the false BU messages to HA and 
CN. The invader can detain these messages and alters them. Then, he delivers them to the CN or HA. If no 
authentication of these BU messages is to be completed, then HA and CN, deem that the message is delivered 
from the MN, will update their BL. But in the steps HR2 and CR2 of the proposed scheme, the invader fails at 
HA and CN during the validation of authentication since NMN is not included in the message exchange rather it 
is stored at the recipient’s side. The attack prevention analysis is tabulated in Table III. 
TABLE III 
Attack prevention analysis 
Scheme  Rerun attack prevention  MITM prevention  False BU attack prevention 
CPA No  No  No 
UBU and EBU  Yes  No  Yes 
OMIPv6 Yes  No  No 
CGA-OMIPv6 No  Yes  Yes 
ERO-MIPv6 Yes  No  Yes 
INF-Based Yes  Yes  Yes 
BHR Yes  No No 
Proposed Yes  Yes Yes 
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Fig. 5. Intruder model: Generating I_CR3 message 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the current research, the registration scheme for MIPv6 with the infrastructure-less based method has been 
proposed for securing the signaling messages of MN with HA and CN. The proposed scheme investigates the 
security issues in the registration of IPv6 mobility. This research has highlighted the several security parameters 
such as authentication, integrity and confidentiality with the symmetric key shared between principals and 
discusses the prevention measures against the security attacks such as rerun attack, MITM attack and false BU 
attack. The registration steps of the scheme are simulated and verified by the Murphi model checker. The 
correctness of the scheme sequences are verified by finite state machine. The scheme can be modeled for further 
concepts such as UMTS, distributed MIPv6, proxy MIPv6, WLAN, and beyond 3G based mobile networks. 
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